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I. INTRODUCTION
"You shall not oppress an alien; you well know how it feels to be an
alien, since you were once aliens yourselves in the land of Egypt."'
Trading in human beings was a well established business enterprise
long before the colonization of the North American continent. With the
exploration and settlement of the New World, slavery rooted itself in
American soil and became a significant source of labor.3 Between 1664
and 1682, many colonies enacted slave codes, which changed the status of
African workers from indentured servants into slaves.4 Having created a
mechanism for enslavement, additional laws were enacted to govern
those enslaved and to make it "increasingly difficult" for them to gain
their freedom. Those African workers who remained free found their
freedom severely constricted by the slave codes. 6
During the eighteenth century, the issue of slavery was openly debated
in the public square. Prominent public figures such as John Jay and
Alexander Hamilton participated in efforts to promote the
"Manumission of Slaves and Protecting such of them that have or may be
Liberated., 7 However, when presented with an opportunity to address

1.

Exodus 23:9.
See PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 8 (1997)
("Throughout the 16th century the Portuguese had a virtual monopoly of the Atlantic
slave-trade. By 1600 nearly 300,000 African slaves had been transported by sea to
plantations -25,000 to Madeira, 50,000 to Europe, 75,000 to San Tom6, and the rest to
America. By this date, indeed, four out of five slaves were headed for the New World. It

2.

is important to appreciate that this system of plantation slavery, organized by the
Portuguese and patronized by the Spanish for their mines as well as their sugar-fields, had
been in place, expanding steadily, long before other European powers got a footing in the
New World." (footnote omitted)).
3. 1 PHILIP S. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 19 (1947) ("Planters discovered that a slave-a worker for life, whose children
became the property of the master-was a more profitable investment than a servant who
left after his period of indenture was up. Moreover, a master could often hire out idle
slaves. Slave maintenance was less than half that of the indentured servant, a fact that
made slavery a labor system desirable to both southern planters and northern
merchants.").
4. Id.
5. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CIVIL WAR DESK REFERENCE 77 (Margaret E.
Wagner, Gary W. Gallagher & Paul Finkelman eds., 2002) [hereinafter CIVIL WAR DESK
REFERENCE].
6. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 88 (2d ed. 1985)

("Free blacks were discriminated against by law, and hounded from colony to colony.
Law and society debased this class and used their low status as an excuse for further
debasement. By 1776, the free black man was a kind of half slave in many parts of the
country.").
7. Id. at 218 (citing MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION 135-36 (1950)).
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the issue of slavery at the Constitutional Convention, delegates declined
to take decisive action.8
The debate over slavery would continue up to the eve of the Civil War.
The Constitution prohibited any ban on the importation of slaves prior to
1808. 9 When the Congress eventually did enact legislation to prohibit the
importation of slaves, the practice of selling slaves who were already in
the United States continued unabated.'
Some individual slave owners
chose to free their slaves in their wills." Some states also enacted
legislation to free slaves residing within their own borders prior to the
Civil War." However, there was a lack of consensus among the states on
this issue. Other states were hostile to the presence of freed slaves within
their borders. 3
At the national level during the same time period, Congress enacted
legislation to ensure the return to owners of slaves who attempted to
escape to freedom, 4 and debated the extension of slavery into new

8. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC 36 (Ward M.
McAfee ed., 2001).
Slavery, as a brooding presence in the land, significantly influenced the
deliberations of the Constitutional Convention, but the Convention made no
calculated effort to affect the institution of slavery, and its members never
conceived of themselves as having any power or responsibility to do so. The
intrusions of slavery into the work of the Convention were largely side effects of
progress toward a new constitutional design.
Id.
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any
of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may
be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.").
10. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 136-37.
11. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 219. Speaking of the end of the eighteenth
century, Friedman notes that
"[a]bolition" was not yet a curse word in the South. Some slave owners actually
set their slaves free. Southern legislatures had for some time indulged in passage
of private acts of manumission.
In 1782, Virginia passed a general, and
permissive law, allowing owners manumission rights.
Maryland, in 1790,
authorized owners to set slaves free by their last will and testament.
Id.
12. Id. at 218-19.
13. Id. at 220-21. Friedman notes that some states enacted "exile" statutes, laws
barring freed slaves from remaining within their borders: "A Tennessee law put it bluntly:
'No free person of color shall remove from any other State or territory of the Union into
this State to reside here and remain in the State twenty days."' Id. at 221 (quoting TENN.
CODE § 2726 (1858)).
14. See Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850) (repealed 1864); Act of Feb.
12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302, 302-05 (1793) (repealed 1864).
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territories. 5 The formulation of a national rather than a state policy
abolishing slavery occurred slowly and incrementally. It was initiated
with the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation 6 and culminated
with the enactment and ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution and its enabling legislation." One historian has noted that
"[e]ven the abolitionist movement could not decide whether the
Amendment was an end or a beginning." 18 For the next century, the
Thirteenth Amendment and its enabling legislation would be challenged
and narrowly construed by the courts, leaving one with the distinct
impression that having extinguished slavery as an institution,
congressmen, senators, and federal judges were now disinclined to
believe that slavery continued to be a national problem.
Victims of modern-day slavery face a similar "willing suspension of
disbelief." Although victims of human trafficking can be found "hiding
in plain sight" in our society, members of the general public find it
15. See JAMES OLIVER HORTON & Lois E. HORTON, SLAVERY AND THE MAKING
OF AMERICA 104 fig. (2005) ("In 1820 the Missouri Compromise allowed Missouri to
enter the nation as a slave state and brought in Maine as a free state. It restricted slavery
in future states carved from the Louisiana territory to the area south of the southern
border of Missouri. Congress hoped this compromise would settle the question of the
extension of slavery once and for all.").
16. 12 Stat. 1268 (1863). Issued September, 1862, the Emancipation Proclamation
provided:
Whereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by the
President of the United States, containing, among other things, the following, to
wit:
"That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any state or designated
part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United
States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive
Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority
thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no
act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make
for their actual freedom."
Id. (emphasis added).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Ratified in January 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment
decreed: "Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Id. §§ 1-2.
18. ERICFONER, RECONSTRUCTION 67 (1998).
Lurking behind these debates was an even broader question suggested by the
end of slavery: Should the freedmen be viewed as individuals ready to take their
place as citizens and participants in the competitive marketplace, or did their
unique historical experience oblige the federal government to take special action
on their behalf?
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difficult to believe that slavery is an active and prosperous enterprise in
this day and age. The limited data available indicates that victims of
human trafficking are generally employed as domestics, agriculture
workers, beggars and panhandlers, sweatshop workers, and employees in
the sex industry.' 9 They are subject to the degradation and mistreatment
associated with the chattel slavery of the past. This is strikingly
illustrated in a case brought recently by a domestic servant in
Minnesota. z° In her complaint, the victim alleged that
[a]fter water flooded the basement, George [the Defendant]
yelled at Uzonwanne and chased her around the house;
punched and beat her about her body, which caused bruising;
refused to allow her to leave the house for about two months;
threatened to send her back to Nigeria; called her evil, stupid
and a bastard child; told her she wanted to kill her and throw
her away, and that if she did, no one would know because no
one knows that she is there; forced her to write a letter in which
she had to write that George was good to her; and locked her in
a basement storage room as punishment.21
In actuality, with the demise of the former Soviet Union 22 and current
instability in many areas of the world, slavery or human trafficking23 has24
once again established itself as a multinational business enterprise.
Because of its clandestine nature, figures on human traffic vary.
According to a monograph prepared for the federal government in 1999,
an estimated 45,000 to 50,000 individuals are trafficked into the United

19. AMY O'NEILL RICHARD, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL
TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN TO THE UNITED STATES: A CONTEMPORARY MANIFESTATION
OF SLAVERY

AND

ORGANIZED

CRIME

3 (2000), http://www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/

women/trafficking.pdf.
20. See Uzonwanne v. George, No. 04CV1126 MJD/JGL, 2004 WL 3023795 (D.
Minn. Sept. 7, 2004).
21. Id.
22. See RICHARD, supra note 19, at 55.
23. See The Prot. Project, Johns Hopkins Univ., Trafficking in Persons or Alien
Smuggling?, GLOBAL ISSUES, June 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0603/ijge/

gj09.htm ("Two kinds of criminal activity involve the illegal movement of persons across
international borders--trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling. Trafficking in
persons and migrant smuggling are similar, but international agreements and national laws
do make distinctions between them .... [1]n cases of alien smuggling, the smuggled alien,
consenting to be smuggled, is treated as a criminal, whereas a trafficked person is
considered a victim of the crime of trafficking since the trafficked person is typically
subject to the 'threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, or fraud and
deception, of the abuse of power, or of a position of vulnerability . . .' and as such, the
person's consent is either lacking altogether or defective." (third alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (quoting United Nations Trafficking in Persons Protocol art. 3(a))).
24. RICHARD, supra note 19, at 55.
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States each year." Figures recently released in a Department of State
26
report mirror these estimates.
In fact, trafficking is a transnational
business that affects over 700,000 men, women, and children each year
and generates annual revenues estimated to be in the billions.27
The challenge presented by modern-day trafficking is that of
implementing an effective legal deterrent that acknowledges and
addresses the injuries traffickers inflict upon their victims. To date, legal
strategies to achieve these goals have been varied. Advocates for victims
have sought redress for their clients by invoking both constitutional
claims and wage and hour laws. 2' Federal law enforcement authorities
have prosecuted traffickers using established federal statutes such as the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 29 and the
recently enacted Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000 (VTVPA).3 °

This Article will limit its examination to three legal approaches to
addressing modern-day slavery: the Thirteenth Amendment, the civil
component of RICO, and the VTVPA as amended in 2003, 3 focusing on
both their strengths and weaknesses. Section I will examine the
applicability and effectiveness of the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. Section II will examine the extent to which the civil
component of RICO may be invoked by victims in trafficking cases.
Section III will review and assess the effectiveness of the VTVPA in
interdicting trafficking and redressing the injuries of trafficking victims.
An examination of the Thirteenth Amendment, civil RICO, and the
VTVPA will demonstrate that each provides at least a limited remedy to
the growing international problem of human trafficking. Arguably,
despite its limitations, the VTVPA has the greatest potential for
25. Id. at 3.
26. U.S. DEP'T OF

STATE, VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING AND VIOLENCE PROTECTION
ACT OF 2000: TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 3 (2001), available at http://www.state.

gov/documents/organization/4107.pdf.
27. See Kathryn E. Nelson, Comment, Sex Trafficking and Forced Prostitution;
Comprehensive New Legal Approaches, 24 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 551, 551-56 (2002)

("Trafficking in women for forced prostitution is a lucrative business for the pimps and
procurers. One estimate puts the total earned by international traffickers at $9 billion per
year." (footnote omitted)).
28. See Becki Young, Note, Trafficking of Humans Across United States Borders:
How United States Law Can Be Used To Punish Traffickers and Protect Victims, 13 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 73, 82-85 (1998).
29. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000 & Supp. 2002), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. §§

1961-1968 (West Supp. 2005).
30. Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8, 18, 20, 22, 27, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).

31. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193,
117 Stat. 2875 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 22 U.S.C.).
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First, in the spirit of the Thirteenth
addressing this problem.
that the problem of human trafficking is
it
acknowledges
Amendment,
that it "[involves] grave violations of human rights and is a matter of
pressing international concern., 32 Second, although it draws upon the
authority of the Commerce Clause and the Foreign Powers Clause of the
Constitution as opposed to constitutionally mandated individual rights,
the VTVPA authorizes both national and international initiatives.3 3 It
allows the Department of State to coordinate strategies to combat
trafficking with both originating and transit countries.34 It implements
community outreach through grants to community-based organizations
35
in an effort to reach victims of trafficking. It creates a new visa program
36
for victims of trafficking and authorizes supportive services to victims of
severe forms of trafficking as well.37
II. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT

A. HistoricalBackground
During the debates on the Thirteenth Amendment, members of
Congress generally acknowledged that slavery was a reprehensible
institution. 3' However, there was not a consensus among congressmen
and senators regarding the benefits to be conferred upon slaves by
enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment.39 In fact, the debate between
supporters and opponents of this Amendment was at times
acrimonious. 40 Many congressmen and senators who supported the

32. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(23).
33. See id. §§ 7101-7102.
34. Id. § 7103(d)(4).
35. Id. § 7105(b)(2)(A).
36. Id. § 7105(c)(3).
37. Id. § 7105(b)(1)(A)-(B).
38. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864). Senator Wilson stated:
Which shall we elect? Shall it be peace? How can it be peace while liberty and
slavery dwell together in our midst? These are enemies. These are ideas which
cannot dwell together in harmony. How can we have peace? Let slavery die.
Let its death be written in our Constitution.
Id.
39. See, e.g., id. at 2982. Congressman Mallory stated: "Now let me ask you a
practical question. What do you intend to do with the slaves you propose to set free? ...
Has anyone attempted to furnish a solution of this question?" Id.
40. Id. at 2986. Congressman Edgerton stated:
The assertion of power or right in a majority of the States, either through the
legislation of the Federal Government or through amendments of the
Constitution, to interfere with or control the domestic institutions of a State,
such, for example, as slavery, essentially repudiates the principle upon which the
Union was formed, namely, the political equality of the States.
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Amendment spoke in terms of legal equality but did not appear to
contemplate that it would confer upon freed slaves social equality.4' For

a period of time, Congress even contemplated funding a "voluntary"
program by which freed slaves would be encouraged and financially
assisted to immigrate back to Africa or South America where they could
establish freedman's colonies.
B. EnablingStatutes
Some legal analysts have suggested that the enactment and ratification
of the Thirteenth Amendment was nothing less than a constitutional
revolution.4 '
As enacted, the Amendment drew upon the slavery
The task of
provisions of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. 4
implementation was to be a daunting one. As one legal analyst has
noted, slavery was based on customary law: "The Thirteenth
Slavery was a
Amendment's countercustomary thrust is clear.
historically present institution of society that had emerged as custom

Id.
41. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 237 (1865). Congressman Smith stated:
Now, sir, if I believed that there was in this country a man with so little sense as
to believe that he would become the equal of the negro, notwithstanding the laws
of this country, notwithstanding the protection he can obtain from Congress,
then I would be willing to vote for a resolution to give him two medals ....
Id.
42.

See CIVIL WAR DESK REFERENCE, supra note 5, at 215.

The movement to encourage black emigration and colonization outside the
United States began more than 40 years before the Civil War and was organized
principally by the American Colonization Society, which settled American blacks
in Liberia. Most free blacks opposed colonization and strongly objected to the
notion that they were not, in fact, American. But, in the 1850s, the colonization
movement revived, and although most free blacks were opposed to it, some
African Americans -notably, Henry Highland Garnet, Martin Delany, and
James Holly-favored colonization. They believed that blacks would never
overcome the blatant discrimination they fought against daily in the United
States.
The start of the Civil War brought a resurgence of enthusiasm for
colonization among whites, as the country struggled with the future of slaves
Lincoln
seeking refuge in Union lines. Thus, emigration was a political issue ....
entertained and sometimes endorsed a series of colonization proposals. On
December 3, 1861, he asked Congress for funds to acquire territory outside the
United States, where contrabands and any free blacks who wanted to emigrate
could be resettled.
Id. (citation omitted).
43. See, e.g., Guyora Binder, Did the Slaves Author the Thirteenth Amendment?: An
Essay in Redemptive History, 5 YALE L.J. & HUMAN. 471, 484-85 (1993).

44. See Ordinance of 1789: The Northwest Territorial Government, I U.S.C. LIII,
LIII-LV (2000).
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before it was recognized as law. To constitutionally abolish45 slavery was
to disestablish and repudiate existing and enduring custom.
The simplicity of this Amendment is striking. Section 1 of the
46
Amendment abolishes the institution of slavery.
Section 2 authorizes
Congress to enact whatever legislation is necessary and proper to
effectuate the purpose of the Amendment.47 There are several aspects of
the Thirteenth Amendment that are noteworthy. First, it abolished not
only chattel slavery, but also involuntary servitude4' and peonage 49 (debt
bondage). Second, it regulated relationships between private parties. It
did not require state action to trigger the protection of the Amendment.0
Third, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, it did not explicitly require
that a person be a natural born or naturalized citizen to benefit from its
protections.5' Finally, it represented a shift from the state to the federal
level in the enforcement of individual rights accorded by the
Amendment. Causes that had traditionally been prosecuted in the state
52
courts could now be prosecuted in the federal court system.
Despite its seeming simplicity, implementation of the Thirteenth
Amendment would prove challenging in the century after its enactment
and ratification. Although Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment was

45. Guyora Binder, The Slavery of Emancipation, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2063, 2066
(1996).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
47. Id. § 2.
48. See 16A C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 482(a) (1984) ("As used in the [Thirteenth]
Amendment, 'involuntary servitude' is the condition of one who is compelled by force,
coercion, or imprisonment and against his will to labor for another whether or not he is
paid, and includes 'peonage."' (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).
49. See 70 C.J.S. Peonage § 1 (2005) ("Peonage is a status or condition of compulsory
service based on the indebtedness of the peon to the master.... [A] peon is one who is
compelled to work for his or her creditor until the debt is paid." (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted)).
50. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
51. Compare id., with id. amend. XIV. Notably, Blacks who were freedmen at the
time of the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment did not yet enjoy the status of
citizens. See Barry Sullivan, Historical Reconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the
ProperScope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541,547-48 (1989).
52. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2986 (1864). Congressman Edgerton
stated:
It [the Thirteenth Amendment] proposes a revolutionary change in the
Government. It seeks to draw within the authority of the Federal Constitution
and the Federal Congress a question of local or internal policy belonging
exclusively to the slaveholding States, and is in conflict with the principles on
which the Union was originally formed, and with the whole theory and spirit of
the Constitution as to the rights of the States.
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intended to be self-implementing, its effects were not immediately felt by
freed slaves. 3 According to one historian:
By 1875, the North's passion for equality had all but dribbled
away. The North lost interest in black welfare; Northern
racism, briefly and thinly covered over, came to the surface
once more. As for the white South, it eagerly embraced the
new situation. The Ku Klux Klan terrorized the blacks.
Ultimately, the South saw to it that blacks did not vote or hold
office. Blacks were relegated to a kind of peonage. They were
to be rural workers on the white man's land. A tight network of
law and practice was woven about rural blacks, who were
desperately poor and largely illiterate. The network consisted
of lien laws for landlords, vagrancy laws, enticement laws
(which made it a crime to lure workers from their jobs, even by
offering them better wages and conditions), laws against
"emigrant agents," who were a kind of labor broker, and even
laws that made it a crime to quit work "fraudulently." None of
these laws specifically mentioned race; but they were practically
speaking directed only against black workers.
In addition, Congress quickly found it necessary to enact legislation
pursuant to Section 2," which authorized "appropriate legislation." 6
According to one legal historian, "[i]mmediately following the
ratification of the Amendment, numerous bills were introduced to
implement it."57 The goal of these bills was to guarantee the rights to the
freedman granted by the Thirteenth Amendment and to penalize
conduct that interfered with those rights. 8 As one historian noted, one
of the bills enacted was
Congress's indignant response to reports of widespread
atrocities against the freedmen and to the Black Codes which
southern legislatures and municipalities had adopted to regulate
the Negroes. "The colored man was free in name only in many
cases. The apprentice, vagrancy, and other provisions of these
statutes forced the Negro into situations where he would be
under the uncontrolled supervision of his former master or
other white men who were ready and willing to exploit his
labor." These laws were designed to exclude Negroes from all
53.

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 504.
54. See id. at 505.
55. See Howard Devon Hamilton, The Legislative and Judicial History of the
Thirteenth Amendment, 9 NAT'L B.J. 26,59 (1951).
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
57. Hamilton, supra note 55, at 59; see, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14
Stat. 27. (1866).
58. See Hamilton, supra note 55, at 59.
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vocations except agricultural labor and to insure that they
remained at work.59
The bills introduced would result in enactment of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 (Civil Rights Act), 6° the Slave Kidnapping Act of 1866,61 the
Anti-Peonage Act of 1867,62 and the 1867 Amendment of the Judiciary
Act.63
The enactment of the Civil Rights Act foreshadowed the debate that
would surround implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment for
decades to come. According to one legal analyst:
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 merits attention, because it was
the only act which evoked extensive discussion in Congress
regarding the meaning and intent of the Amendment. That act
declared that all persons born in the United States and not
subject to any foreign power were citizens ....
Other sections of the act punished any official who should
deprive a person of any right secured by the act, conferred
exclusive jurisdiction over violations to federal courts, required
federal officials to enforce it, and authorized the use of the
military forces in its enforcement.
Opponents of the Act in Congress cited several grounds for their
opposition. First, they alleged the Act violated principles of federalism
and exceeded the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment. Citing
debate reported in the CongressionalGlobe, one analyst notes that "[t]he
question of civil rights, it was argued, was not at all related to the
abolition of the status or condition of slavery." 66 According to historian
Eric Foner:
Lurking behind these debates was an even broader question
suggested by the end of slavery: Should the freedmen be viewed
as individuals ready to take their place as citizens and
participants in the competitive marketplace, or did their unique
historical experience oblige 67the federal government to take
special action on their behalf?

59.
STATUS
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 61 (footnote omitted) (quoting CHARLES
OF THE NEGRO 27 (1940)).
ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
ch. 86, 14 Stat. 50.
ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546.
Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
Hamilton, supra note 55, at 55.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 63.
FONER, supra note 18, at 67.

0.

MANGUM, THE LEGAL
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The results of enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment in the aftermath
of the Civil War were mixed. On the one hand, the courts were willing to
interpret Section 1 of the Amendment broadly to include groups other
than Blacks.68 On the other hand, the courts were unwilling to apply
Section 2 of the Amendment broadly to prohibit the "Jim Crow" laws
that states enacted, which perpetuated the incidents or badges of
slavery. 69 According to one analyst:
The constitutionality of [the 1866 Civil Rights] Act has never
been passed upon by the Supreme Court, and its essential
portions still remain on the statute books, but a series of cases
between 1866 and 1906 have developed a cloud of
unconstitutionality and have nearly drained its vitality, and with
it much of the vitality attributed to the Thirteenth Amendment
by its sponsors.

70

During the first decade after its enactment, the Thirteenth
Amendment was actively enforced. 71 However, by the end of that decade
the federal courts began to narrowly interpret the Amendment, often
denying relief to petitioners. 7 For almost a century, courts would
routinely reject efforts by plaintiffs seeking legal redress for violations
arising under Section 2 on the grounds that the Amendment was not
intended to regulate the social relationships of private parties.7 3 The
courts appeared disinclined to address the residual effects of the old state
slave codes and the newly enacted Jim Crow laws.74 Some analysts have
attributed this to the fact that Congress and the courts were more
68. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872) ("We do not say
that no one else but the negro can share in this [Thirteenth Amendment] protection.").
69. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) ("When a man has emerged
from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable
concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when
he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and
when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which
other men's rights are protected.").
70. Hamilton, supra note 55, at 64.
71. See id. at 64-67.
72. See Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV, C.R.C.L. L. REV. 1, 17-25 (1995).
73. See Howard Devon Hamilton, The Legislative and Judicial History of the
Thirteenth Amendment, 10 NAT'L B.J. 7, 7 (1952) ("[T]he claim of involuntary servitude

has failed in a variety of cases, some of them plausible claims, others devoid of any merit.
In rejecting these claims, the courts [sic] have construed the term "involuntary servitude"
strictly and have employed two rules of construction: (1) distinctly personal service is
necessary, and (2) the Amendment must be given a reasonable, not an extravagant,
interpretation. The Amendment contemplated African slavery and systems akin thereto.

in which one person possesses virtually unlimited authority over another; it did not enact
novel doctrines."); see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 23-25.
74. See FONER, supra note 18, at 205.
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concerned with reintegrating the secessionist states back into the Union.75
Others have suggested that
[f]ew amendments have elicited so little litigation; compare it
with Fourteenth Amendment in this respect. There are a
number of factors which may explain the small volume of
litigation: the Civil War had destroyed the economic utility of
slavery and there was little desire to revive it; the addition of
similar provisions to the southern state constitutions; poor
Negroes lacked the means to engage in litigation. Perhaps, as
the Supreme court said, "African slavery was well understood
76
in this country" and hence required no interpretation.
Whatever the reason may have been, enforcement of Section 2 of the
Amendment
would abate until the 1968 case of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
77
Co.

C. Scope of Coverage
1. EncouragingFree Labor
It appears that during the first decade after the Civil Rights Act's
enactment, most federal courts treated it as constitutional.78 This is
79
illustrated by the federal cases of In re Turner,
which involved the
"apprenticeship" of former slave children,80 and United States v. Rhodes,"'
which involved discrimination against black testimony in Kentucky
courts.
During this same period of time, a number of state courts reviewed this
813
According to Howard Devon
Act and found it to be constitutional.
Hamilton, "the act was held constitutional by the supreme courts of
Louisiana, Indiana, and California." 84 However, the Kentucky Supreme
Court foreshadowed future narrow construction of the Act by federal
courts in holding the Act invalid on the grounds that

75. See, e.g., id. at 204-05 ("In much of the South, the courts of Presidential
Reconstruction appeared more interested in disciplining the black population and forcing
it to labor than in dispensing justice.").
76. Hamilton, supra note 55, at 55.
77. 392 U.S. 409, 419-20 (1968).
78. Hamilton, supra note 55, at 64.
79. 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).
80. Id. at 339.
81. 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151).
82. Id. at 785-86, 794.
83. See Hamilton, supra note 55, at 65.
84. Id. (citing Hart v. Hoss & Elder, 26 La. Ann. 90 (1874), Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind.
299 (1866), and People v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658 (1869)).
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[t]he Amendment did nothing but free the slave from his
master; it did not give him the rights of the white race, nor in
any way diminish state jurisdiction over him. "Slavery had an
explicit, well-defined, and thoroughly understood meaning....
To say that the power to abolish slavery includes the right to
make the 85 freedman a competent witness, is simply an
absurdity.
The first of the Federal Supreme Court cases interpreting the
Thirteenth Amendment was the Slaughter-House Cases in 1873.86 The
cases posed a challenge to a Louisiana statute which granted the
Crescent City Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company (Crescent
City) a monopoly to operate a slaughterhouse within the region of New
Orleans.87 The petitioner, a butcher who was denied the right to operate
a slaughterhouse by dint of the monopoly granted to Crescent City,
argued that the statute amounted to an involuntary servitude under the
Thirteenth Amendment because the statute which created it also
deprived one class of persons of their property or freedom to pursue
their occupation and violated the Fourteenth Amendment by abridging
the Privileges and Immunities Clause
In construing the Thirteenth Amendment claim, the Court
acknowledged that the rights accorded by Section 1 of the Amendment
were not limited to freed slaves. 89 Rather, the Amendment was an
absolute prohibition against slavery in all its forms.9° The Court noted:
We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this
protection. Both the language and spirit of these articles are to
have their fair and just weight in any question of construction.
Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the
Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any
other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or
the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the
Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this amendment
may safely be trusted to make it void. And so if other rights are
assailed by the States which properly and necessarily fall within
the protection of these articles, that protection will apply,
though the party interested may not be of African descent.

85. Id. at 66 (quoting Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 5 (1867)).
86. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
87. Id. at 57.
88. Id. at 43, 55.
89. Id. at 72.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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Having affirmed the broad scope of Section 1 of the Thirteenth
Amendment, the Court went on to say that the legislation in question
imposed a servitude upon the land, not upon the individual petitioners.92
Moreover, the Court determined that the "privileges and immunities"
referred to by the petitioners "lay within the constitutional and
legislative power of the States, and without that of the Federal
government, '93 thereby shifting the enforcement of individual rights back
to the states.
The federal courts would soon have another opportunity to interpret
In United States v.
the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.
94
the amendment
to
whether
raised
as
was
the
question
Cruikshank,
Although the
reached private conduct other than forced labor.9
for
over-breadth,
was
based
was
dismissed
indictment on which the case
Amendment allowed
the court confirmed in dictum that the Thirteenth
96
Congress to eliminate the "badge of servitude.
2. Eradicatingthe "Badges of Slavery"
The Civil Rights Cases,97 which were decided by the Supreme Court in
1883, foreshadowed a shift in the Court's interpretation of the Thirteenth
Amendment. These consolidated cases involved a challenge to Sections
1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act,98 passed by Congress on March 1, 1875. 9

92. Id. at 61.
93. Id. at 77.
94. 25 F. Cas. 707 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 14,897).
95. Id. at 708-09.
96. Id. at 711.
97. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
98. Id. at 5.
99. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335. The sections of the law that were
challenged provide:
[Sec. 1]. That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters,
and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and
limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and
color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.
Sec. 2. That any person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to
any citizen, except for reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and
color, and regardless of any previous condition of servitude, the full enjoyment of
any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges in said section
enumerated, or by aiding or inciting such denial, shall, for every such offense,
forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved thereby,
to be recovered in an action of debt, with full costs; and shall, also, for every such
offense, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall
be fined not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or shall
be imprisoned not less than thirty days nor more than one year ....
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Enacted pursuant to the Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth
Amendment, the purpose of the 1875 Act was to eradicate the badges of
slavery.' °°
It prohibited denying persons equal access to public
accommodations and services on the basis of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude. 0 " The cases did not all arise in the antebellum
South. Plaintiffs were drawn from California, Kansas, Missouri, New
York, and Tennessee." 2 This was probably not coincidental. According
to historian Eric Foner, some Blacks became active participants in
exercising
their newly created rights after enactment of the Civil Rights
03
Act. 1
Large parts of the black belt remained untouched by organized
politics, but many blacks were aware of Congressional debates
on Reconstruction policy, and quickly employed on their own
behalf the Civil Rights Act of 1866. "The negro of today,"
remarked a correspondent of the New Orleans Tribune in
September 1866, "is not the same as he was six years ago....°
He has been told of his rights, which have long been robbed."'0
The threshold issue the Civil Rights Cases presented the Court was
whether sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 were
unconstitutional. 0 5
First, the Court examined the Thirteenth
Amendment, which it acknowledged abolished slavery in all its forms,
and authorized Congress to enact necessary legislation to abolish the
badges and incidents of slavery in the United States. 01 6 Next, the Court
turned to the issue of whether "the denial to any person of admission to
the accommodations and privileges of an inn, a public conveyance, or a
theatre, does subject that person to any form of servitude, or tend to
fasten upon him any badge of slavery.' ' 0 7 The Court concluded that
"such an act of refusal has nothing to do with slavery or involuntary
servitude, and that if it is violative of any right of the party, his redress is
Id. ch. 114, 18 Stat. at 336.
100.

See id. ch. 114, 18 Stat. at 336.

101.

Id.

102. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3. The cases consolidated as the Civil
Rights Cases were: United States v. Stanley, United States v. Ryan, United States v. Nichols,
United States v. Singleton, and Robinson v. Memphis & CharlestonRailway Co. Id.
103. See FONER, supra note 18, at 118.
104. Id. at 118-19 (alteration in original) (citing WILLIAM C. HARRIS, THE DAY OF
THE CARPETBAGGER 96 (1979)); see also CIVIL WAR DESK REFERENCE, supra note 5, at
216 ("Even as they campaigned for the emancipation of slaves, free blacks in the North
also focused their efforts on obtaining voting rights, ending discriminatory laws, and
serving in the Union army. Together with white abolitionists, they challenged accepted
practices at both the national and state levels.").
105. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 8-9.
106. Id. at 23.
107. Id. at21.
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to be sought under the laws of the State,' ' 8 thereby marking a shift in
authority from the federal to the state level when individual rather than
state infringements on the rights of freedmen were implicated. In so
holding, the Court noted that
[w]hen a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable
concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere
citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and
when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the
ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected. '0 9
In the aftermath of this decision, the Thirteenth Amendment ceased to
be an effective tool in combating the residual effects of the institution of
slavery. As one legal analyst noted:
In the political, social, economic and judicial history of the
United States, the Thirteenth Amendment has had a minor,
even an insignificant part. Its history, subsequent to enactment,
has never lived up to its historic promise as the "grand yet
simple declaration of the personal freedom of all of the human
race within the jurisdiction of this government." 0
This characterization is corroborated by the case law of the period.
Sections 1 and 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and its enabling statutes
provided viable legal tools for combating involuntary servitude and
peonage but not the badges of slavery. For example, in the early 1900s a
number of cases were filed in the federal court system challenging the
practice of debt bondage, which had established itself in the former
Confederacy.'

108. Id. at 24.
109. Id. at 25.
110. Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitutionof the United States:
Consummation to Abolition and Key to the FourteenthAmendment, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171,
171 (1951) (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1872)).
111. See Harry H. Shapiro, Involuntary Servitude: The Need for a More Flexible
Approach, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 65, 73-74 (1964) ("Peonage or debt bondage was endemic

to the social, economic and legal traditions of the Latin American countries, particularly
Mexico, but was a system different from slavery. It was present in the New Mexico
Territory when that territory was acquired from the Republic of Mexico, and was
commonly known as the 'Mexican System.' Despite the enactment in 1867 of the AntiPeonage Act, a debt bondage, although disappearing in New Mexico, found ready
acceptance in some parts of the former Confederacy, where the former slave owner and
others saw in the emancipated, but illiterate, propertyless, and unskilled Negro a source of
cheap labor. It was in reality a condition of slavery without the holding in property of the
Negro." (footnote omitted)).
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Commencing with the Peonage Cases,' 2 the federal courts delineated
what legally constitutes a condition of involuntary servitude or peonage
(debt bondage)." 3 Challenges to the constitutionality of the AntiPeonage Act were unsuccessful.
Between 1906 and 1947, courts
would7
6
hear peonage cases arising in South Carolina,"' Florida,' Georgia,"
Alabama, 18 and California.' 9
Whether acting pursuant to a state
criminal statute or a personal labor contract, the elements that were
present in each case were the use of physical coercion and threats of legal
action to force the individual to continue working for the defendant.
In
the instance of peonage, the added element that kept the worker from
leaving was his alleged indebtedness to the employer. 121
In the late 1930s, the Department of Justice established a separate
division of Civil Rights. 2 2 As a result of this, the Department of Justice
embarked on a campaign to more aggressively enforce the civil rights
statutes enacted pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment. A concomitant
of this campaign was a strategy to breathe life back into this Amendment
as a tool for eradicating the badges and incidents of slavery. 23 By the
1960s, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice was actively
prosecuting involuntary servitude and peonage cases and complaints. 4
According to statistics compiled by the division's Appeals and Research
Section, between 1961 and 1963 the division handled 104 complaints
from thirty-one different states. 125
In 1963, the case of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,1 26 breathed life back
into Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment when the Supreme Court
112. 123 F. 671 (M.D. Ala. 1903).
113. See id. at 673-75.
114. See, e.g., Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 218 (1905).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Clement, 171 F. 974, 974-75 (D.S.C. 1909).
116. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 12 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1926).
117. See, e.g., Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29 (1942).
118. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219,227 (1911).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. 76, 77 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
120. See Taylor, 315 U.S. at 29; Bailey, 219 U.S. at 244; Clyatt v. United States, 197
U.S. 207, 219 (1905); Davis, 12 F.2d at 255; Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. at 78; Clement, 171 F. at
976.
121. See, e.g., Taylor, 315 U.S. at 29; Bailey, 219 U.S. at 228-29; Davis, 121 F.2d at 256;
Clement, 171 F. at 976.
122. Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Originsof Civil Rights,
50 DUKE L.J. 1609, 1616 (2001).
123. Id. at 1639-40.
124. See Shapiro, supra note 111, app. at 85.
125. See id. But see Goluboff, supra note 122, at 1682 n.280. Goluboff suggests that
from the 1950s onward, the Department of Justice abandoned the Thirteenth Amendment
in favor of the Fourteenth Amendment in its civil rights strategy. See id.
126. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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held that housing discrimination constituted a badge of slavery and was
constitutionally prohibited."' In more recent decades, courts have seen a
flurry of Thirteenth Amendment challenges brought by a wide array of
plaintiffs. 18 The cases fall into one of two broad categories. The central
theme of the first category of cases is government activity that is deemed
to be oppressive to or infringe upon the freedoms of individual citizens. 9
It is the second category, which focuses on employment and similar
relationships between private parties, 30 that is relevant for purposes of
this Article.
Although the more recent cases arise in a variety of factual contexts,
the elements that must be satisfied to prevail are the same. If the
allegation is involuntary servitude, there must be legal or physical
coercion and an inability of the victim to leave.3 If the allegation is
peonage, there must also be indebtedness to the employer. 1 2 For
example, in a recent Fourth Circuit case, the court ruled that charging
migrant workers for their groceries, forbidding them to leave camp until
all debts were paid, and threatening the workers with beatings and death
violated both the criminal ban on slavery and the Thirteenth
Amendment. 33 A federal court also has held that a residential institution
for the mentally disabled must limit inmate work duties to those
reasonably related to therapeutic treatment. 34 However, the courts have
determined that some forms of coerced labor are permissible. These
included requiring extended active duty by an Air Force enlistee
pursuant to an enlistment contract, 135 allowing school districts to require
students to complete hours of community service as a condition of

127. Id. at 438-39.
128. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 129-30.
129. See, e.g., Dublino v. N.Y. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 348 F. Supp. 290, 295 (W.D.N.Y.
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 413 U.S. 405 (1973) (challenge to work requirements in
state welfare program); Immediato ex rel. Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 873 F. Supp
846, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 1996) (challenge to a high school's
requirement that students perform community service in order to graduate from high
school).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527, 527 (1944) (deciding whether the
acts of holding, arresting, or returning to peonage constitute three distinct offenses); Davis
v. United States, 12 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1926) (determining whether a party charged
with aiding and abetting who did not actually make arrest of persons returned to peonage
was entitled to acquittal); Bernal v. United States, 241 F. 339, 341-42 (5th Cir. 1917)
(holding an employee against his will to pay a debt constitutes peonage).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 566 (4th Cir. 1981).
132. See, e.g., Dolla v. Unicast Co., 930 F. Supp. 202, 204-05 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
133. See Booker, 655 F.2d at 563-64.
134. See Widenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445,450-51 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
135. See Lonchyna v. Brown, 491 F. Supp. 1352, 1353-54 (N.D. Ili. 1980).
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requiring recipients of public assistance to work as a

condition of eligibility for benefits,' and requiring attorneys to represent
indigent defendants pro bono."3
Efforts continue to extend the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment.'39
However, for the present, in order to prevail in a suit alleging a violation
of Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment, a plaintiff will have to prove
that he was "compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment and against
his will to labor for another whether or not he is paid.' ' 0 If the victim
has an alternative to the employment in question, albeit an unpleasant
one, the test for involuntary servitude may not be satisfied. 14' While the
court may consider the characteristics of the individual victim, the

coercion must be physical or legal. 42 If the coercion is primarily
psychological, the courts are unlikely to find that the conduct rises to the
level of involuntary servitude.1
D. Applicability to Modern-Day Trafficking

Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment embodies an absolute
prohibition against slavery, involuntary servitude, and peonage.
136. See Immediato ex rel. Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 873 F. Supp. 846, 851
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 1000 (3d Cir. 1993).
137. See Brogan v. San Mateo County, 901 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1990).
138. United States v. DeLaCruz, 870 F.2d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1989).
139. See Karen Goss, The Debtoras Modern Day Peon: A Problem of Unconstitutional
Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165, 201-05 (1990); Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond
Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the ThirteenthAmendment, 4 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 251 (1992).
140. See 16A C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 482 (1984).
141. See United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 486 (2d Cir. 1964) ("But a holding in
involuntary servitude means to us action by the master causing the servant to have, or to
believe he has, no way to avoid continued service or confinement, in Mr. Justice Harlan's
language, 'superior and overpowering force, constantly present and threatening,'-not a
situation where the servant knows he has a choice between continued service and freedom,
even if the master has led him to believe that the choice may entail consequences that are
exceedingly bad." (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Hodges v. United States,
203 U.S. 1, 34 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
142. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988).
143. See id.at 949-50 ("The Government has argued that we should adopt a broad
construction of 'involuntary servitude,' which would prohibit the compulsion of services by
any means that, from the victim's point of view, either leaves the victim with no tolerable
alternative but to serve the defendant or deprives the victim of the power of choice.
Under this interpretation, involuntary servitude would include compulsion through
psychological coercion as well as almost any other type of speech or conduct intentionally
employed to persuade a reluctant person to work. This interpretation would appear to
criminalize a broad rang of day-to-day activity ....Under such a view, the statutes would
provide almost no objective indication of the conduct or condition they prohibit, and thus
would fail to provide fair notice to ordinary people who are required to conform their
conduct to law." (citations omitted)).
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Coverage under this Amendment does not hinge upon citizenship.
Rather, the applicability of the Amendment turns on the conditions of
employment and the impact of those conditions on the employee(s).1" In
other words, has the employer used physical or legal coercion? Has the
impact of that coercion subordinated the will of the employee to the
point that he believes that he has no other option but to continue
working for the employer despite the slave-like conditions of
employment?
The jobs in which victims of modern-day trafficking are placed are
diverse. Depending upon the trafficking organization and the country of
origin of the victim, 45 trafficked workers may be placed as agricultural
laborers, garment workers in the clothing industry, household domestics,
food industry workers, or prostitutes.1 46 These placements have much in
common. The victims are usually isolated and deprived of a support
system.147
They may be housed in overcrowded barracks or
dormitories.
Usually, they are denied contact by mail or telephone
with friends and family.194
They are monitored when they leave the
workplace or dormitory.5
They are frequently verbally and physically
abused."' Their passports, visas, and return airplane tickets often are
withheld from them by the trafficker. 52 They are required to work off
the cost of their passage to the United States, room and board, and any
incidentals provided by the employer at exorbitant rates.'53 Despite these
deplorable conditions, the victims often remain in their jobs because they
fear prosecution because
of their illegal immigration status or threats of
154
harm to their families.
In a recent case involving a former domestic worker, an employee sued
for various tort claims and involuntary servitude. 55 She alleged that her
employers tricked her into accompanying them from the Philippines to
the United States.5 6 Once in the United States, she was forced to live in

144. See supra text accompanying notes 131-38.
145. See RICHARD, supra note 19, at v, 3.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 5, 25.
148. See id. at 25, 48.
149. See id. at 5
150. See Manliguez v. Joseph, 226 F. Supp. 2d 377, 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); RICHARD,
supra note 19, at 25-26.
151. RICHARD, supra note 19, at 25.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 25, 48.
Id. at 25.
See id.
Manliguez, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 380.
Id.
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In addition to running the
crowded quarters with the family.'57
household, she was expected to provide childcare for the family's three
158
She worked from 4:00 a.m. to 10:30 p.m. every day for seven
children.
days a week. 59 Her employers denied her sick days and vacation days'
They controlled her food supply.161 She was emotionally abused and
physically isolated. 62 The family denied her a means of exiting their
apartment and monitored her movements on those occasions when she
was allowed to leave the apartment.1 63 She was not allowed to use the
household telephone to call her mother in the Philippines and her
employer withheld mail sent to her by her family.'6 Her wages "were
wired to her bank account in the Philippines for her mother's use."1 65 For
two years of employment, the plaintiff received only $1050 for her
166
wages.
Relying on the definition of involuntary servitude enunciated by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Kozminski, 67 the court held that
[t]hese [Plaintiff's] allegations describe acts of barbarism and
unrelenting mental brutality reminiscent of the gulag
memorialized by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in his novel entitled
One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. Consequently, I find
that Plaintiff has stated a claim for involuntary servitude and is
entitled to pursue civil relief for Defendants' alleged violation
of her civil rights.' 6'
Ms. Manliguez's conditions of employment are fairly representative of
those of other victims of modern-day trafficking.69 Consequently, as one
commentator noted, this "modern, third-generation form of slavery...
implicates the core concerns of the Thirteenth Amendment. Modern
victims' work is performed under various forms of physical or
157. Id. at 380-81.
158. Id. at 381.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 381-82.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 382.
165. Id. at 381.
166. Id.
167. 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
168. Manliguez, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 384-85.
169. See, e.g., Jane Doe I v. Reddy, No. C 02-05570WHA, 2003 WL 23893010, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2003) ("Plaintiffs claim defendants fraudulently induced them to come
to the United States from India on false promises that they would be provided an
education and employment opportunities, but then forced them to work long hours under
arduous conditions for pay far below minimum wage and in violation of overtime laws,
and sexually abused and physical [sic] beat them.").

2005]

Modern-Day Slavery

psychological threat as well as under conditions that deprive victims of
of their humanity, rendering their labor coerced rather
essential aspects
170
than free.,
E. Effectiveness as a Remedy
The government currently implements the Thirteenth Amendment
through a series of criminal statutes.1 7' These statutes have been used to
"convict defendants for activities ranging from employing migrant farm
laborers to forced prostitution, and they have potential application in a
However, these statutes do not73
broad range of trafficking cases. 17'
create a private civil cause of action for victims of trafficking.'
Consequently, a victim of trafficking must first meet the challenge of
establishing a legal basis for a private cause of action. Arguments in
support of a private cause of action are predicated on the assumption
It needs no
that "[t]he Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing.
ancillary legislation to give it effect. Because it is an absolute prohibition
on the existence of slavery,
74 private actors are liable for breaching the
Amendment.'
Thirteenth
In practice, whether a victim will be permitted to bring an implied
private cause of action under one of the criminal civil rights statutes will
depend upon the judicial circuit in which his case is brought. The court
in the Manliguez case cautioned that "[t]he Supreme Court has yet to
recognize that a private cause of action exists for involuntary servitude
under the Thirteenth Amendment.' 75 However, the Manliguez court
concluded that
recognizing a private civil cause of action for involuntary
servitude would be consistent with the underlying legislative
purpose of section 1584 because it would provide a victim with a
direct and efficient means of protecting his or her rights and
deter potential offenders from 7engaging in behavior that the
statute was designed to prohibit. 1

170. Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a
Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 1035 (2002).
171. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1584 (2000).
172. Young, supra note 28, at 82.
173. See Azmy, supra note 170, at 1036-37 ("Congress has not yet created a civil cause
of action for violations of the Thirteenth Amendment."); see also Turner v. Unification
Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 373-76 (D.R.I. 1978), aff'd, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979).
174. Samantha C. Halem, Slaves To Fashion: A Thirteenth Amendment Litigation
Strategy To Abolish Sweatshops in the Garment Industry, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 397, 416
(1999) (footnote omitted).
175. Manliguez v. Joseph, 226 F. Supp. 2d 377, 383 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
176. Id. at 384.
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In doing so, it cautioned that "[slome courts in other
177 circuits have
declined to extend civil liability for section 1584 claims.,
If a victim can establish that a private civil cause of action exists under
the Thirteenth Amendment enabling statutes, there is still a question as
to what he is entitled to as a remedy. One legal analyst has suggested
that a victim could seek restitution but cites no cases in which the courts
have granted restitution or other damages to victims of involuntary
servitude.7 7 Another has suggested that restrictive judicial construction
of the Thirteenth Amendment presents a significant obstacle to plaintiffs

invoking it effectively.' In the absence of a private cause of action that
allows the remedy of damages, a favorable decision is little more than a
pyrrhic victory.
In sum, although the goal of the Thirteenth Amendment is to prohibit
involuntary servitude and to interdict it when it occurs, it still does not
provide an adequate remedy for victims of human trafficking. Modernday slavery has become a transnational business; consequently, it
demands a transnational solution. While the Thirteenth Amendment can
address trafficking within the United States, it cannot be used to interdict
trafficking in the countries of origin or transit. Moreover, there is
nothing intrinsic in the Thirteenth Amendment or its construction by the
courts that protects victims of trafficking as witnesses in court
proceedings or insulates them from immigration proceedings. It is, in
fact, a remedy of limited effectiveness.
III. THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
ACT
A. Legislative Background
What is deemed by some courts to be implicit in the Thirteenth
Amendment, a private cause of action and the right to damages, is
explicitly provided for in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). 180 RICO was enacted as Title IX of the

177. Id. at 384 n.8.
178. See Halem, supra note 174, at 416.
179. See Lauren Kares, Note, The Unlucky Thirteenth: A ConstitutionalAmendment in
Search of a Doctrine, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 372, 380 (1995) ("Judicial deference to
Congress' role as interpreter of the Thirteenth Amendment creates a considerable barrier
to plaintiffs seeking to vindicate Thirteenth Amendment-based rights. Although federal
legislation may create a cause of action against conduct that Congress perceives to be a
badge of slavery, plaintiffs cannot challenge actions that they believe are badges of slavery
in the absence of specific congressional authorization." (footnote omitted)).
180. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000).
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Organized Crime Control Act of 1970." ' It was enacted pursuant to a
congressional determination that
(1) organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually
drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful
conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2)
organized crime derives a major portion of its power through
money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated
gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the
importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous
drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and
power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate
business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our
democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the
United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic
system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations,
interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and
foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and
undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens;
and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in
the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the
development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to
bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the
unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and
because the sanctions and remedies available to the
Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of
organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal
tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new
penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime.8 2
The statutory scheme enacted as the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, which included RICO, was comprehensive. It created the authority
for special grand juries,"' established "use" immunity rather than
"transaction" immunity in designated proceedings,1 84 codified the current

181. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968).
182. Id., 84 Stat. at 922-23.
183. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 32 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4007;

see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3334 (2000).
184. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 32-33, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4007-08; see
also 18 U.S.C. § 6002.
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civil contempt practices with regard to recalcitrant witnesses, 5
established a new "false declaration provision applicable in Federal
grand jury and court proceedings,"' authorized the Attorney General to
"protect and maintain Federal or State organized crime witnesses and
their families,"' 8 7 and authorized the government to "preserve testimony
by the use of a deposition in a criminal proceeding.' 8 The Act also
authorized limiting the "disclosure of information illegally obtained by
the Government to defendants who seek to challenge . . . [its]
admissibility,
made it illegal to operate illegal gambling businesses,'9°
created a criminal and civil cause of action against "Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,"' 19' provided for extended
sentences for "dangerous adult special offenders,"' and established new
federal controls "over the interstate and foreign commerce of
explosives.' ' 193
Perhaps in acknowledgement of criticism that the
legislation conferred unfettered law enforcement authority, 114 a National
Commission on Individual Rights was also established whose mandate
was
to conduct a comprehensive study and review of Federal laws
and practices relating to special grand juries and to special
offender sentencing authorized under this act, wiretapping and
electronic surveillance, bail reform, and preventive detention,
no-knock search warrants, and the accumulation of data on

185. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 33, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4008; see also 28
U.S.C. § 1826 (2000).
186. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 33, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4008; see also 18
U.S.C. § 1623.
187. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 32-33, reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4008.
188. Id. at 33-34, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4009; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3503
(repealed 2002).
189. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 34, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4009; see also 18
U.S.C. § 3504(a)(2).
190. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 34, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4009; see also 18
U.S.C. § 1955.
191. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 35, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4010; see also 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000 & Supp. 2002), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 (West Supp.
2005).
192. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 35, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4010; see also 18
U.S.C. §§ 3575-3576 (1982) (repealed 1984).
193. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549 at 36, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4011; see also 18
U.S.C. §§ 841-848 (2000 & Supp. 2002), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 842, 844-845 (West
Supp. 2005).
194. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549 at 185, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4081 ("[I]t [Title
IX] runs amuck.
It embodies poor draftsmanship, and it employs penalties and
investigative procedures which are both abusive and pregnant with the potential for
abuse.").
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individuals by Federal agencies
as authorized by law or
95
acquired by executive action.
Since its enactment, RICO has been amended on numerous occasions.
The amendments have extended the reach of RICO to include
"trafficking in contraband cigarettes,"'196 interstate transportation of
stolen vehicles and stolen vehicle parts,' 7 witness tampering, 8 the sexual
exploitation of children,'" and financial institution fraud. 2,M Of particular
relevance to this Article are the recent amendments that address
passport and visa fraud in conjunction with peonage and slavery, illegal
smuggling of aliens, and add peonage, slavery, and trafficking
in persons
20
to the statutory definition of "racketeering activity., '
Given the breadth of the RICO statute, it should come as no surprise
that both criminal and civil applications of RICO have provoked heated
debate. As one legal analyst noted:
Since its enactment in 1970, the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") has been one of the most
controversial of federal statutes. Its criminal provisions are
both novel and stringent, and apply to a greater range of
conduct than any other criminal law. Its private civil provisions
not only expand the scope of federal civil jurisdiction to cover
most business torts but also materially alter the balance of
power between plaintiffs and defendants. And under RICO's
so-called "government civil" provisions, the state can assert
control over entire businesses and organizations.
During the 1990s many of the fundamental questions
regarding RICO's scope and power were resolved.
Nevertheless, the statute remains difficult to apply because its
terms are artificial and not easily correlated with everyday
experiences. 2
195. Id. at 36, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4011-12.
196. Act of Nov. 2, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-575, § 3(c), 92 Stat. 2463, 2465-66 (amending
18 U.S.C. § 196l(1)(B)).
197. Motor Vehicle Theft Law Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-547, §§ 204205, 98 Stat. 2754, 2770 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)).
198. Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99646, § 50, 100 Stat. 3592, 3605 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a)).
199. Minor and Technical Criminal Law Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100690, § 7054, 102 Stat. 4395, 4402 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B)).
200. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, § 968, 103 Stat. 183, 506 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)).
201. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
433, 110 Stat. 1214, 1274 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)).
202. Jed S. Rakoff, The Fundamentalsof RICO, in RICO: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW
AND STRATEGY § 1.01, at 1-3 (Jed S. Rakoff & Howard W. Goldstein eds., 2000)
(footnote omitted).
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A part of this controversy may be attributed to the fact that the
number of cases filed under civil RICO has increased progressively over
2031
the past two decades.
Many of these cases are now perceived by critics
of civil RICO to raise "pedestrian fraud claims"2 4 and issues that
Congress did not intend to cover with the RICO statute.2 5
B. Scope of Coverage
1. The PredicateElements of a RICO Claim
In order to prevail in a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must establish that
the defendant has engaged in one or more of the four categories of
206
conduct prohibited by the statute.
These categories are enumerated in
18 U.S.C. § 1962 and include:
(1) using or investing any income derived from a "pattern of
racketeering activity" to acquire an interest in or to establish an
"centerprise";
(2) acquiring or maintaining an interest in or control of an
"enterprise" through "a pattern of racketeering activity";
(3) conducting or participating in an "enterprise's" "pattern
of racketeering activity" whether as an employee or an
associate; or
207
(4) conspiring to violate any of the above.
The burden is on a plaintiff who files a RICO action to plead the
elements of the cause with specificity. He must allege the "(1) conduct
(2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity"
and "show that (5) he was injured in his business or property (6) by
reason of the RICO violation."' ' If a plaintiff is able to prove each of
these elements, he is entitled to recover treble damages for the injury.. he
209
has sustained and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees,
203.

See William J. Hughes, RICO Reform: How Much Is Needed?, 43 VAND. L. REV.

639, 644 (1990).
204. Michael P. Kenny, Escapingthe RICO Dragnet in Civil Litigation: Why Won't the
Lower Courts Listen to the Supreme Court?, 30 DUo. L. REV. 257, 257 (1992).
205. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Reforming Diversity
Jurisdiction and Civil RICO, Address at the Eleventh Seminar on the Administration of
Justice (Apr. 7, 1989), in 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 5, 9 (1989) ("[C]ivil RICO is now being used
in ways that Congress never intended when it enacted the statute in 1970. Most of the civil
suits filed under the statute have nothing to do with organized crime. They are gardenvariety civil fraud cases of the type traditionally litigated in state courts.").
206. Gary P. Naftalis, Civil RICO: Basic Applications, in RICO: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
LAW AND STRATEGY, supra note 202, § 2.01, at 2-3.
207. Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (2000)).
208.

D'Addario v. Geller, 264 F. Supp. 2d 367, 388 (E.D. Va. 2003) (citation omitted).

209.

18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
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provided that the injury for which he seeks compensation is a
quantifiable injury to business or property, not personal injury.1 0
The expansion of RICO jurisdiction and the breadth of authority it
confers on law enforcement agencies and private
parties
•
•
21,necessitates that
the courts play a significant role in its interpretation.
Consequently,
there is substantial case law (though not necessarily judicial consensus
among the circuits) on what constitutes each of the enumerated elements
of a RICO civil action. 22 As a result, courts have been challenged to
apply the RICO provisions to an interesting array of defendants. Parties
ranging from governmental entities to television programs have been
sued pursuant to civil RICO."'
The civil component of RICO effectuates the "congressional objective
of encouraging civil litigation to supplement Government efforts to deter
and penalize . . . prohibited practices. The object of civil RICO is thus
not merely to compensate victims but to turn them into prosecutors...
dedicated to eliminating racketeering activity. ' ' 21 4 While civil RICO
litigants will not be held to the same evidentiary standards applied in a
criminal RICO prosecution, they will be required to plead the elements
of a civil RICO claim with specificity and to prove each element.'
"Further, a substantial majority of courts require that the complaint state
the time, place, and content of the fraudulent misrepresentations"
and
21 6
the individual roles of each party to the fraudulent activity.
In order to effectively prosecute a case under civil RICO, certain
factual predicates must be satisfied. The plaintiff must allege that a
person has employed a "pattern of racketeering activity '' 21 7 or the
proceeds of racketeering activity in a manner that affects an interstate

210.

Stephen D. Brown & Alan M. Lieberman, RICO Basics: A Primer,35 VILL. L.

REV. 865, 867 (1990).
211. Id. at 866 ("The development of RICO as a private civil cause of action has taken
the statute far beyond its original purposes. The basic elements of the statute define
organized crime. Yet this definition is not limited to the traditional concept of the
gangster or the mob involved in narcotics, prostitution, illegal gambling, extortion,
contract murder, contract arson and similar conduct associated with traditional organized
criminal elements in the United States. RICO defendants can be a Fortune 100 company
and its CEO just as easily as Nicky Scarfo and La Cosa Nostra.").
212. Id. at 865.
213. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 233 (1989) (adjudicating a
suit against a telephone company by customers alleging it gave members of the state
public utilities commission bribes to influence their rate schedule decisions); Word of
Faith World Outreach Ctr. Church, Inc. v. Sawyer, 90 F.3d 118, 121 (5th Cir. 1996).
214. Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549,557 (2000).
215. Rakoff,supra note 202, § 1.04[1][d][i], at 1-26 to -27.
216. Id. § 1.04[1][d][ii], at 1-29 to -30.
217. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000).
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enterprise. 218 The effect of the racketeering activity may be established
by one of the following: (1) investing the income derived from a pattern
of racketeering in the enterprise;2 19 (2) acquiring or maintaining an
interest in a business through a pattern of racketeering;220 or (3)
conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering. 22' An additional element must be alleged in a civil RICO
case: injury to the plaintiff's
property or business by reason of the
222
racketeering activity.
Each of the elements of a civil RICO action is established by statute.
Given the limited legislative history and definitional provisions of the
statute, the courts have had to play a pivotal role in construing the
statutory elements. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) defines "person"
to include "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property." 221 In applying this section of RICO, the
courts have held that La Cosa Nostra, an organized crime organization
also referred to as "the Mafia," is not a person for purposes of RICO,224
but an unincorporated association may be.225
The "enterprise" in question will need to be "an entity separate and
apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages. 2 26 There is a lack
218. Id. § 1962.
219. See Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 497 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (stating that a
complaint that fails to allege that a defendant had ownership interest in the enterprise or
that he used commission earned on plaintiffs' transactions to invest in said enterprise does
not satisfy requisites of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)).
220. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Perez, 52 F. Supp. 2d 297, 300 (D.C.P.R. 1999).
In Perez, the insurer filed a civil RICO claim against two partners in crime. Id. at 299.
The claim detailed insurance fraud involving previously wrecked cars. Id. at 299-300. The
court found that the plaintiff had satisfied the pleading requirements by pleading with
specificity that the partners were associated with the alleged enterprise in fact. Id. at 300.
221. See Newman v. Rothschild, 662 F. Supp. 957, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). In Newman
the court held that the plaintiff must allege not only that defendant is engaged in activities
that affect interstate commerce, such as the purchase and sale of securities, but must also
allege a common purpose and predicate acts relating to the common purpose. Id.
222. Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1497 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a civil
RICO plaintiff must establish a causal connection between plaintiff's injury and
defendant's predicate acts of fraud); see also Pilkington v. United Airlines, 112 F.3d 1532,
1536 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff's claim of emotional and mental distress
rather than injury to property or business is not cognizable under civil RICO).
223. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3).
224. See United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, 879
F.2d 20, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1989).
225. See Jund v. Town of Hempstead, 941 F.2d 1271, 1281-82 (2d Cir. 1991).
226. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); see also Cedric Kushner
Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 160 (2001) ("This case focuses upon a person who
is the president and sole shareholder of a closely held corporation. The plaintiff claims
that the president has conducted the corporation's affairs through the forbidden 'pattern'
....In these circumstances, are there two entities, a 'person' and a separate 'enterprise'?
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of uniformity among the federal circuits regarding the degree of
227
organization and structure required to constitute an "enterprise.,
However, the Eighth Circuit has enunciated a three-prong test that has
been adopted and adapted by some of the other circuits. 22" To establish
an "association in fact" enterprise, the Eighth Circuit has required "(1)
those engaged in the enterprise must share a 'commonality of purpose';
(2) the enterprise must 'function as a continuing unit'; and (3) the
enterprise must have 'an ascertainable structure distinct from that
' 29
inherent in the conduct of a pattern of racketeering activity. , 1
Moreover, the same individual or entity may not be alleged to be "both
230
the liable 'person' (the defendant) and the enterprise (the 'victim').,
Once a plaintiff has established that there is an entity satisfying
RICO's definition of "person," he must then prove that the person has
engaged in one of the predicate offenses that constitutes "racketeering
activity" under the Act.23 ' The predicate acts enumerated in RICO
encompass a wide range of federal and state criminal statutes. The
federal offenses include bribery, counterfeiting, embezzlement from
pension and welfare funds, extortionate credit transactions, dealing in
obscene matter, passport and visa fraud, and white slave trade.232 State
offenses that constitute predicate acts include "any act or threat
involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery,
extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in [narcotics or other
dangerous drugs], which is chargeable under
State law and punishable by
23
imprisonment for more than one year. 1
Despite the numerous federal and state statutes that provide predicate
acts for a RICO suit, plaintiffs still face a daunting task. Lower federal
courts will carefully scrutinize the pleadings for specificity.23 A plaintiff
who fails to allege each element of the RICO predicate act that is alleged
to be a part of the pattern of racketeering may face dismissal of his
complaint by the court.233
...[W]e conclude that the 'person' and 'enterprise' here are distinct and that the RICO

provision applies.").
227.

See Rakoff, supra note 202, § 1.05[1].

228. See id. § 1.05[2], at 1-49 to -50.
229. Id. § 1.05[2], at 1-49 (quoting United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 665 (8th Cir.
1982)).
230.

Id. § 1.05[3], at 1-55.

231.

18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2000).

232.
233.

Id.
Id.

234. See Rakoff, supra note 202, § 1.04[1][d][i], at 1-26 to -27 & 1-27 n.22.
235.

See Tierney & Partners, Inc. v. Rockman, 274 F. Supp. 2d 693, 698-99 (E.D. Pa.

2003) (establishing that where the plaintiff failed to identify particular conduct committed
by vice presidents formerly employed by the company that constituted predicate acts of
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Having established the statutory requirements of a person who has
engaged in one or more of the RICO predicate acts, the plaintiff must
still establish a pattern of racketeering activity. This requires proof of
two of the specified predicate acts within a ten year period; one of which
must have occurred after the enactment of RICO.236 Once again, the
courts have filled the gaps in the RICO statute by enunciating judicial
criteria to apply in determining whether the requirement of a pattern of
racketeering is met. Among the factors to be considered are whether the
alleged predicate acts are related and part of a continuous criminal
endeavor,237 "the number.., of predicate acts and the length of time over
which they were committed,",238 as well as "the number of putative
victims, the presence of separate schemes, and the potential for multiple
distinct injuries. 2 39 Consequently, when "the plaintiffs have alleged a
single scheme directed at a single victim .
resulting in a single injury"
and involving similar acts that all occurred in less than a year,240 or where
a clear pattern of fraudulent activity was "addressed to one contract and
did not comprise or threaten the 'kind of "continued" activity at which
the RICO statute was aimed,' ' '241 the courts have found that the "pattern
of racketeering" requirement was not met. 42
Last, but not least, RICO requires that plaintiffs establish that the
injury they have sustained to business or property was caused by the
RICO violation. 243 Thus, the plaintiff must be able to prove that he has
been directly injured by or has been the direct target of the racketeering
activity on which his suit is based. Failure to establish the requisite
244
causal nexus will result in dismissal of the case.

racketeering activity and invoices allegedly transmitted by company did not provide
sufficient details regarding mail or wire fraud or furtherance of the overall fraudulent
scheme).
236. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
237. See Int'l Data Bank v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 1987).
238. Jones v. Lampe, 845 F.2d 755, 757 (7th Cir. 1988).
239. Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1185 (4th Cir. 1988).
240. See Wade v. Hopper, 993 F.2d 1246, 1250-51 (7th Cir. 1993).
241. Sys. Mgmt. Inc. v. Loiselle, 303 F.3d 100, 105-06 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Apparel
Art Int'l, Inc. v. Jacobson, 967 F.2d 720, 724 (1st Cir. 1992)).
242. See Loiselle, 303 F.3d at 105-06; Hopper, 933 F.2d at 1251.
243. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
244. Maryville Acad. v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 530 F. Supp. 1061, 1066-67, 1069 (N.D.
I1. 1981); see also Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 270-71, 274, 276

(1992).
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2. Current Trends in Case Law
In recent years, in addition to filing civil RICO claims on their clients'
245
behalf, plaintiffs' attorneys have pursued these claims as class actions.
One commentator suggests that "pleading a RICO claim may provide a
basis for asserting fraud claims otherwise not certifiable because of
individualized reliance issues that defeat the predominance requirement
for class certification."2 46 This commentator also points to two recent
court decisions that "provide competing views concerning whether a
RICO claim avoids the reliance problem by permitting classwide reliance
to satisfy the predominance requirement. 247 The first of these decisions,
Sandwich Chef ofC Texas, Inc. v. Reliance National Indemnity Insurance
248
48
was issued by the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals.
Co.,
250
The second, Klay v. Humana, Inc.,
was issued by the Eleventh
251
Circuit.
In Sandwich Chef, the plaintiffs, who were businesses in forty-four
states, alleged that 141 insurance companies collaborated with the
National Council on Compensation Insurance to overcharge them on
employee workers' compensation claims over a fourteen year period.252
The fraudulent scheme involved making false filings with state insurance
253
regulators and sending the employer policyholders inflated billings.
The district court judge certified the class, concluding that the plaintiffs
"could prove RICO proximate causation without requiring individual
proof of reliance, and rejected the defendants' contention that
predominance could not be satisfied because the plaintiffs would have to
demonstrate injury through individual proof., 25 4 The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that RICO fraud cases require that a
misrepresentation be relied upon by each plaintiff, individually, and that
255
each individual plaintiff must show detrimental reliance.
The Eleventh Circuit took a different position in the case of Klay v.
Humana, Inc.256 As the court noted: "This is a case of almost all doctors

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See Linda S. Mullenix, RICO Class Actions, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 29, 2004, at 10.
Id.
Id.
319 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2003).
Id.
382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 877 (2005).
Id.
Sandwich Chef, 319 F.3d at 211.
Id.
Mullenix, supra note 245 (citing Sandwich Chef, 319 F.3d at 215).
Sandwich Chef,319 F.3d at 219-20.
382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 877 (2005).
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versus almost all major health maintenance organizations (HMOs).. ." as
257
The plaintiffs alleged that the HMOs'
well as subscribers to the HMO.
reimbursement system is based on "covertly denying payments
to physicians based on financially expedient cost and actuarial
criteria rather than medical necessity, processing physicians'
bills using automated programs which manipulate standard
coding practices to artificially reduce the amount they are paid,
payments to gain increased use
and ... systematically delaying
25 8
of the physicians' funds.,
The defendants argued that class certification under Federal Rule of
259
They
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) was improper for several reasons.
alleged that "common questions of law and fact concerning the federal
claims do not predominate over individual issues specific to each
as well. 26 °
plaintiff" and that this was true of the plaintiffs' state claims
They also alleged that "regardless of whether common issues of law and
fact predominate, a class action is inferior to other methods of
adjudicating them."26' Although the court expressed concerns about the
definition of the plaintiff classes, the court rejected the defendants'
262
It noted that "the common issues of fact discussed in the
arguments.
previous Section, concerning the existence of a national conspiracy, a
pattern of racketeering activity, and a Managed Care Enterprise, are
quite substantial. They would tend to predominate over all but the most
complex individualized issues., 263 The court also concluded that the
numerosity of the class militated in favor of class certification: "It is
ridiculous to expect 600,000 doctors across the nation to repeatedly prove
these complicated and overwhelming facts."'2 64
In recent years, the courts have also reviewed the issue of whether
"competitive injury" satisfies the requirement of direct injury to business
and property requirement in a civil RICO suit. 26' These cases entail some
form of third party injury as a consequence of the defendants' 266conduct.
legally
For example, in the case of Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co.,
agricultural workers alleged that growers hired
documented
undocumented workers through an employment agency to leverage and

257.
258.

Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1247 (quoting Plaintiffs' Complaint at $ 6).

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 1251.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1259.
Id. at 1258-59.
Id. at 1260.
See, e.g., Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002).
301 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2002).
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depress their wages. In the case of Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza,268
the plaintiff alleged that its competitor caused it to lose sales by failing to
pay the state and municipal sales tax and falsifying its sales records to
conceal that fact.269 In the case of Commercial CleaningServices, L.L.C.
v. Colin Service Systems, Inc.,270 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
hired illegal aliens to perform its cleaning work.2 7' This allowed the
defendant to underbid the plaintiff for cleaning contracts and resulted in
the plaintiff's loss of contract work.272
In each case, the courts were called upon to determine whether the
plaintiffs were alleging direct injury caused by the defendant enterprise's
engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity or "passed on" injury. The
courts, relying on the analytical framework provided by the case of
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,273 determined that in each
instance the plaintiffs satisfied the threshold showing of injury required
to withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). 274 The courts noted that there could be multiple classes of
victims in such fraudulent schemes.17' The courts also cautioned in each
case that the plaintiffs would bear the burdening of proving the requisite
elements of direct harm, i.e., that they were the target, victim, or
customer of the defendants' scheme and suffered harm as a consequence
of that scheme. 276 However, based on the facts presented by the plaintiffs
in each case, the courts concluded that the impact of an alleged RICO
scheme on the wages of employees, the customer base of an iron and
building supply business, or existing contracts of a cleaning business
sufficiently satisfied the requirement of an injury to business or property
to allow the plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss. 277

267.

Id. at 1166-67.

268.

373 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 2004).

269.

Id. at 253.

270.
271.

271 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 378-79.

272. Id. at 379.
273. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
274. See Ideal Steel, 373 F.3d at 263-64; Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1168-70; Commercial
Cleaning Servs., 271 F.3d at 381-82.
275. See Ideal Steel, 373 F.3d at 262-63; Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1171; Commercial
Cleaning Servs., 271 F.3d at 383-84.
276. See Ideal Steel, 373 F.3d at 257; Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1168; Commercial Cleaning
Servs., 271 F.3d at 380.
277. Ideal Steel, 373 F.3d at 264; Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1171; Commercial Cleaning
Servs., 271 F.3d at 381.
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C. Applicability to Modern Trafficking
While a plaintiff who initiates a civil RICO suit against modern-day
traffickers will face some challenges, an examination of the elements of a
civil RICO cause will demonstrate that it can be done without unduly
stretching the meaning of the statute. As noted above, there must be a
person or "legal entity."27 8 Trafficking often involves an array of actors.
According to a monograph prepared for the Department of State in
1999:
In the United States, trafficking in women and children is
primarily being conducted by smaller crime rings and loosely
connected criminal networks. The nucleus of several of these
crime rings centers around a family. There may be additional
overlaps among the categories as many crime rings use their
connections abroad to contract out duties. It is this amorphous
nature of these rings and networks that make combating
trafficking 2in79 women a challenging problem for law
enforcement.
The amorphous nature of these organizations does not preclude
satisfying the "person" requirement. As the court concluded in the case
of United States v. Goldin Industries, Inc.,20 a case involving three
corporations that dealt in scrap metal and defrauded their customers by
sending fraudulent checks and invoices and short-weighing the loads of
scrap metal brought to the corporations for purchase,
[t]he terms "person" and "enterprise" in the [RICO] statute
have been specifically defined by Congress . . . . Moreover,
under our case law, a RICO enterprise need not possess an
"ascertainable structure" distinct from the associations
necessary to conduct the pattern of racketeering activity....
The Supreme Court has held that the existence of an
enterprise "is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization,
formal or informal, and by evidence
that the various associates
28
function as a continuing unit., '
Consequently, for purposes of RICO jurisdiction, the small or family
crime rings, the loosely connected criminal networks, the gangs, and the
informal associations they form with each other would constitute a
"person" and "enterprise" individually and collectively. Traffickers in
humans clearly meet this threshold. 282
278. See supra text accompanying notes 223-30.
279. RICHARD, supra note 19, at 51.
280. 219 F. 3d 1271, 1273 (11th Cir. 2000).
281. Id. at 1274-75 (citations omitted).
282. See Lan Cao, Note, Illegal Traffic in Women: A Civil RICO Proposal,96 YALE
L.J. 1297, 1309 (1987).
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Trafficking by its very nature satisfies the requirement of two factual
predicates within a ten-year period. It is a process that usually begins
with the perpetuation of a fraud on the victim. 2 3 It is effectuated by
It culminates in
coercion and falsification of immigration documents .
the victim's providing coerced labor or services such as prostitution, or
agricultural, sweatshop, or domestic labor.285 The above activities are
among those enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) of RICO as predicate
acts 286 and are generally carried out in a manner that satisfies the time
prerequisites as well.287

The challenge for prosecuting a civil RICO action for victims of
trafficking will be establishing injury to business or property. One legal
analyst has suggested that the element of injury can be met if the premise
is accepted that a woman's body is her property. 2 9 He contends that
[p]rostitution enterprises control and use prostitutes' bodies
as vehicles for conducting their illegal business. The victims'
bodies are, in essence, treated as property to generate profit for
the enterprise. If the injury is perpetrated on the premise that
victims' bodies are "property," the law should recognize this
fact and 29address
the violation rather than pretend that it does
°
not exist.

To run and furnish the sex slave business, women are recruited by organized
rings of procurers, using fraudulent recruiting methods. For example, they are
abducted, procured through organized crime, recruited by phony employment
agencies, and trafficked into the U.S. via false marriage contracts.
In all these schemes, the procurers are not loose and disjointed groups
sporadically engaged in pimping activities. On the contrary, they are organized
networks structured to procure, transport, and retain women in prostitution.
Once procured, the women are psychologically conditioned, physically and
mentally intimidated, and if needed, trafficked through established
transportation networks.
Id. at 1299-1301 (footnotes omitted).
283. Id. at 1299, 1301-02.
284. Id.
285. RICHARD, supra note 19, at 51.
286. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2000).
287. RICHARD, supra note 19, at 51 ("A review of trafficking and slavery operations,
involving sweatshop, agricultural, and other forms of labor, over the last eight years
showed that these operations went unnoticed or were able to exist longer than sex
trafficking operations. Labor trafficking operations generally lasted from 4 to 6 years,
whereas trafficking operations for prostitution lasted from a little over a year to
approximately 2 years before being discovered.").
288. Cao, supra note 282, at 1312.
289. See id. at 1315.
290. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Aside from the fact that this argument seems to commodify the
victims, it would not appear to be applicable to victims who are trafficked
into other jobs like agricultural, domestic, and sweatshop labor. An
alternative argument is suggested by the Mendoza case, in which the
plaintiffs
' claimed "an injury to their property in the form of lost
wages. '29
A common element in the different categories of trafficking is
that the victim is lured into the control of the trafficker by promises of
jobs and wages that do not materialize. 92 In addition to the lost wages
argument, victims may also argue that one's personal labor is a property
right. Once the victim becomes the captive of the trafficker, he is also
denied his property right to contract his labor without interference where
he sees fit for a price that he finds acceptable.2 93
The last hurdle that victims of trafficking must overcome is the issue of
damages. Victims clearly incur injuries in the form of lost wages, lost
work opportunities, physical and emotional injury, and possible shame
within their country of origin as a consequence of their employment in
the sex industry. However, none of these injuries are compensable under
RICO.2 94 RICO only compensates plaintiffs for injuries to business or
295
Moreover, the damages alleged
property, not for personal injuries.
must be quantifiable; they must not be speculative.296
D. Adequacy as a Remedy
To the extent that the facts of a human trafficking case fit within the
conceptual framework of civil RICO, victims have access to broader
remedies than those provided by the Thirteenth Amendment. The
Thirteenth Amendment vindicates a dignitarian interest. It affirms that
trafficking in humans is reprehensible. However, the ability of victims of
human trafficking to use the Thirteenth Amendment to vindicate their
rights is tentative. There is no consensus among the judicial circuits that
297
a private cause of action exists under the Thirteenth Amendment.
Moreover, there is judicial uncertainty regarding whether a violation of

291.

Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002).

292. See Cao, supra note 282, at 1299-1300.
293. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 56 (1872) ("The right to
labor, the right to one's self physically and intellectually, and to the product of one's own

faculties, is past doubt property, and property of a sacred kind.").
294. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
295.

See Pilkington v. United Airlines, 112 F.3d 1532, 1536 (11th Cir. 1997); Oscar v.

Univ. Students Coop. Ass'n, 965 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1992).
296.

See Astech-Marmon, Inc. v. Lenoci, 349 F. Supp. 2d 265, 270 (D. Conn. 2004).

297. See supra Part II.D.
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the Thirteenth Amendment entitles the victim of the breach to
291
damages.
Civil RICO fills some of the gaps in Thirteenth Amendment coverage.
It explicitly authorizes a private cause of action. 29 It also authorizes
court costs, attorneys fees, and treble damages for injury to business or
property. 3° It also has the potential for extraterritorial application.30' A
separate provision, passed as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970 in conjunction with RICO, provides protection for witnesses and
their families as federal witnesses.3 2 However, RICO's provisions may
provide only nominal compensation to victims whose jobs would
normally pay the minimum wage. It does not compensate the victims for
the mental and physical health problems they may develop as a
consequence of their treatment at the hands of traffickers. Last but not
least, civil RICO does not remedy the risk that victims
30 3 of trafficking may
be deported during the pendency of their RICO suit.
IV.

VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING AND VIOLENCE PROTECTION ACT OF

2000
A. Legislative and Regulatory Framework
The formulation of current United States policy on human trafficking
began in 1998. In the wake of growing awareness of the problem, the
Clinton administration implemented an initiative it referred to as the
three "P's. ' 4 "On March 11, 1998, President Clinton issued a directive
establishing a U.S. government-wide anti-trafficking strategy of (1)
prevention, (2) protection and support for victims, and (3) prosecution of
The strategy, as announced, had strong domestic and
traffickers.

298. See supra Part II.D.
299. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
300. Id.
301. Kristen Neller, Note, Extraterritorial Application of RICO: Protecting U.S.
Markets in a Global Economy, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 357 (1993). But see N. S. Fin. Corp. v.

AI-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996) ("In considering the limits of subject matter
jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds, our analysis in the past has focused on
whether one of two alternative tests has been satisfied: the 'conduct test' and the 'effects
test."'); Butte Mining PLC v. Smith, 76 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1996) ("We do not suppose
that Congress in enacting RICO had the purpose of punishing frauds by aliens abroad
even if peripheral preparations were undertaken by them here.").
302. Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 501-504, 901, 84 Stat. 922, 933-34, 941 (1970). The current
provision concerning protection of witnesses is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3521 (2000).
303. See U.S.C. § 1964 (2000).
304. See FRANCIS T. MIKO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30545, TRAFFICKING IN
WOMEN AND CHILDREN: THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 8 (2004), http://fpc.
state.gov/documents/organization/31990.pdf.
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international policy components., 30 5 This initiative culminated in the
bipartisan enactment of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA).3°6
The stated purpose of the VTVPA is "to combat trafficking in persons,
a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are
predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective
punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims."30 7 The findings in
support of the Act are extensive and capture much of the information
that is known about the demographics, logistics, and impact of
trafficking.3 8 Of particular significance in the "Findings" section is the
Act's reaffirmation of the principles underlying the Thirteenth
Amendment:
One of the founding documents of the United States, the
Declaration of Independence, recognizes the inherent dignity
and worth of all people. It states that all men are created equal
and that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights. .

.

. Acknowledging this fact, the United

States outlawed slavery and involuntary servitude in 1865,
recognizing them as evil institutions that must be abolished.
Current practices of sexual slavery and trafficking of women
and children are similarly abhorrent to the principles upon
which the United States was founded.3°
This legislation addresses trafficking on a national and international
level.310 It vests congressional oversight in the Committee on Foreign
Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the Committee
on International Relations, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the
House of Representatives.3" ' The Secretary of State is now required to
submit to Congress an annual report on efforts by countries receiving
United States economic or security assistance to combat trafficking.312
An interagency task force was established to monitor and combat
trafficking.3 3 The President is authorized to "establish and carry out
international initiatives to enhance economic opportunity for potential
victims of trafficking as a method to deter trafficking., 314 These
305. Id.
306. Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8, 18, 22, 27 and 42 U.S.C.).
307. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2000).
308. Id. § 7101(b).

309. Id.§ 7101(b)(22).
310. Id.§ 7101 (b)(23).
311. Id.§§ 7102(1), 7105(g), 7107(b)(1), 7108(b).
312.
313.
314.

Id. § 2151n(f).
Id. § 7103.
Id.§ 7104(a).
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programs may range from micro-credit lending programs and initiatives
that promote the economic and educational status of women to public
awareness campaigns on the dangers of trafficking.3 Protection and
assistance is authorized for victims of trafficking in other countries3 16 and
in the United States.3"7 To that end, victims in the United States who
previously were ineligible for assistance under many governmental
assistance programs because of their status as illegal aliens are made
eligible for certain entitlement programs administered through the
Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Labor,
and the Legal Services Corporation."'
The legislation directs the
Attorney General and the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
promulgate regulations that will treat victims of trafficking as victims of
crime rather than as illegal aliens, and authorizes the creation of a
special visa program (referred to as the T visa) for victims of severe
forms of trafficking.320 Minimum standards are set for "the elimination of
trafficking applicable to the government of a country of origin, transit, or
destination for a significant number of victims of severe forms of
trafficking .... 32 To ensure that the minimum standards are met, the
legislation authorizes the President to "provide assistance to foreign
countries directly or through nongovernmental and multilateral
organizations, for programs, projects, and activities designed to meet the
minimum standards for elimination of trafficking. ' '322 To motivate
noncompliant governments, the Secretary of State is directed to submit
to Congress a report each year which lists both countries that have and
countries that have not complied with the minimum standards as defined
323
by the legislation.
The President is authorized to withhold nonhumanitarian, non-trade-related assistance when he determines that a
country has not complied and has not made a significant effort to comply
with the minimum standards.

324

He is also authorized to impose the

penalties set forth in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
to sanction significant traffickers in persons. 325
Prosecution and
punishment of traffickers is strengthened by amending the criminal code

315. Id.
316. Id. § 7105(a).
317. Id. § 7105(b).
318. Id. § 7105(b)(1)(A)-(B).

319.

Id. § 7105(b)(1)(C), (E).

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1182, 1184 (2000).
22 U.S.C. § 7106(a).
Id. § 2152d(a).
Id. § 7107(b)(1).
Id. § 7107(d)(1).
Id. § 7108.
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to increase criminal penalties," 6 and adding provisions pertaining to
"[f]orced labor";32 7 "[t]rafficking with respect to peonage, slavery,
involuntary servitude, or forced labor";328 "[s]ex trafficking of children";
or trafficking "by force, fraud[,J or coercion ;129 unlawful conduct with
regard to passports and other immigration documents; 30 and
"[m]andatory restitution" to victims. 33 ' Part B of the Act, The Violence
Against Women Act, also provides additional services to battered
immigrant women.

332

These provisions have been supplemented by the

Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, 333 which
includes provisions directed at noncompliant destination countries,
elevates the importance of prosecution, requires better statistical
monitoring, establishes a special watch list,334 and creates a private, civil
cause of action.335

In tacit recognition of the urgent need to quickly implement this
legislation, the Attorney General and Secretary of State were directed to
promulgate regulations to implement certain provisions within 180 days
of the VTVPA's enactment.336 On July 24, 2001, the Department of State
(DOS) and Department of Justice (DOJ) jointly promulgated an interim
regulation.33 ' The stated purpose of this regulation was to provide
guidance concerning "(1) [pjrotections for victims of severe forms of
trafficking in persons while in custody; (2) victims' access to information
and translation services; (3) authority to permit continued presence in
and potential witness; and (4) training of
the United States of a victim
338
government personnel.,
To effectuate these goals, the regulations set the following legal
They define what are considered "severe forms of
parameters.

18 U.S.C. §§ 1583-1584 (2000).
327. Id. § 1589.
328. Id. § 1590.
329. Id. § 1591 (footnote omitted).

326.

330.
331.

Id. § 1592.
Id. § 1593.

332. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106386, §§ 1502-1513, 114 Stat. 1464, 1518-37 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
333. Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2878 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.).
334. 22 U.S.C. §§ 7106(b), 7107(b) (2000), amended by 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 7106(b),
7107(b) (West 2004).
335. 22 U.S.C.A. § 1595 (West Supp. 2004).
336. 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c) (2000).
337. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 1100.25-.37 (2004).
338. Protection and Assistance for Victims of Trafficking, 66 Fed. Reg. 38,514, 38,514
(July 24, 2001) (codified as amended at 28 C.F.R. § 1100.27) (citations omitted).
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'
trafficking in persons."339

They differentiate between alien smuggling

and severe forms of trafficking.3 40 The regulations also describe the
forms of support and assistance that victims are eligible to receive.3 4' For
example, the regulations acknowledge that trafficking victims are victims
of crime, not criminals.343 As a consequence, they are to be "housed in a
manner appropriate to their status as crime victims. 3 43 They are also to
be provided "proper medical care and other assistance. 344 Victims of
trafficking must also be provided "access to information about their
rights and with translation services. 3 45 Procedures are established to
allow federal law enforcement authorities to request that potential
witnesses be permitted to remain in the country and to protect the
victims and their family members against intimidation and threats of
reprisal.

346

In addition to these regulations, each federal agency that has a role to
play in the implementation of the VTVPA would have had to amend its
current regulations or promulgate new ones to carry out its mandate.
For example, prior to the enactment of this legislation, victims of
trafficking would not have been eligible for the Department of
Agriculture's Food Stamp Program, Health and Human Services'
Medicaid Program, or the Legal Services Corporation funded free civil
legal aid because of their illegal immigration status. 34 The VTVPA
removes these restrictions, subject to certain limitations.348
B. Executive Branch Implementation
1. Interagency Branch Implementation

Responsibility for implementing the VTVPA is distributed among
However, to ensure effective
several executive branch agencies.
coordination, a cabinet level task force is also mandated. 349 To that end,
President Bush has issued a National Security Presidential Directive that

339. 28 C.F.R. § 1100.25.
340. See id.
341. Id. §§ 1100.25,.31-.35.
342. See id. § 1100.27.
343. Id. § 1100.27(a)(1).
344. Id.
345. Id. § 1100.27(a)(2).
346. Id. § 1100.27(a)(3).
347. See Human Trafficking & Modern-day Slavery, http://gvnet.com/humantraffick
ing/USA.htm (follow "more" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
348. Id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 1100.27(d).
349. 22 U.S.C.A. § 7103 (West 2004).
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establishes a Cabinet-level Interagency Task Force to Monitor and
Combat Trafficking in Persons.350
The task force is chaired by the Secretary of State and includes
the Attorney General, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, and the Administrator
of the U.S. Agency for International Development35
The duties of the Task Force include coordinating and implementing
the administration's anti-trafficking activities.352
2. Individual Agency Initiatives
At the agency level, the following executive agencies have
responsibility for carrying out specific program initiatives and services to
victims of trafficking: the Department of Justice, the Department of
State, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department
of Labor, and the Legal Services Corporation. 353 The program initiatives
for which each agency is responsible are described briefly below.
As the following chart illustrates, each agency now has a broader role
For example, in addition to
to play in addressing trafficking.
investigation and prosecution of traffickers, the Department of Justice
has responsibility for training federal prosecutors and agents, conducting
community outreach in an effort to better identify victims of trafficking,
and coordinating services to victims of trafficking with the Department
of Health and Human Services. The Department of Justice oversees the
special visa program created for victims of severe forms of international
trafficking, the T visa program, and the Department of Health and
Human Services coordinates certification of victims who are approved
Similarly, the
for T visas to receive other governmental benefits.
Department of State has primary responsibility for coordinating antitrafficking efforts with other governments through education and other
technical assistance. In addition, it reports on the status of other
governments' efforts to combat trafficking in its annual report to
Congress. The Department of Labor, traditionally viewed as a domestic
labor agency, also has an international role to play in combating
trafficking, working with both nongovernmental organizations and the
International Labor Organization.

350. Exec. Order No. 13,257, 67 Fed. Reg. 7259 (Feb. 13, 2002).
351. Human Trafficking & Modern-day Slavery, supra note 347.
352. Id.
353. See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1)(B) (2000), amended by 22 U.S.C.A. § 7105(b)(1)(B)
(West 2004).
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DUTIES
1. Conducts anti-trafficking training for
federal prosecutors and agents.354
2. Investigates and prosecutes traffickers."'
3. Conducts an outreach program to educate
victims of trafficking about their rights and
creates working relationships with communitybased organizations. 56
4. Coordinates with the Department of Health
and Human Services to certify the eligibility of
victims of trafficking to receive various federally
funded or administered benefits. 57
5. Oversees the T visa program, which benefits
victims of severe forms of international
trafficking.358

Department of State

1. Operates the Office to Monitor and
Combat Trafficking in Persons. 9
2. Sponsors anti-trafficking programs in other
countries. 36
3. Has primary responsibility for educating
and soliciting the cooperation of other countries
in combating trafficking.361
4. Publishes the annual Trafficking In Persons
(TIP) Report assessing "other governments'
362
efforts to combat trafficking in persons.,

354. Press Release, White House, Trafficking in Persons National Security Directive
(Feb. 25, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030225.html.
355. Human Trafficking & Modern-day Slavery, supra note 347.
356. CIVIL RIGHTS Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS AND
WORKER EXPLOITATION TASK FORCE, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/crim/tpwetf.htm (last
visited Oct. 21, 2005).
357. Trafficking in Persons National Security Directive, supra note 354.
358. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Issues T Visa To
Protect Women, Children and all Victims of Human Trafficking (Jan. 24, 2002),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/January/02-crt-038.htm.
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1. Certifies the eligibility of victims of
trafficking to receive "temporary housing, legal
assistance, educational opportunities, mental
health counseling, foster child care,
and other benefits. 363
2. Promotes public awareness campaigns to
provide information to victims and organizations
that may serve them.36'
3. Provides grants to nongovernmental
and provide
organizations to conduct outreach
65
services to trafficking victims.

Department of Labor

Legal Services
Corporation

4. Coordinates certification of victims who are
approved for T visas."
1. "[C]ombats international trafficking
through its own programs and through
nongovernmental and faith-based
organizations. ,,367
2. "[W]orks in conjunction with the
International Labor Organization's campaign to
eliminate child labor."36
1. Makes legal assistance available to victims
of trafficking through its grantees. 69

359. Human Trafficking & Modern-day Slavery, supra note 347.
360. See id.
361. John R. Miller, The United States' Effort to Combat Trafficking in Persons,
GLOBAL ISSUES, June 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/O603/ijge/gjO2.htm (last
viewed Oct. 21, 2005).
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. See Wade F. Horn, U.S. Human Service Agencies Respond to Trafficking,
GLOBAL ISSUES, June 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0603/ijge/gjO3.htm (last
viewed Oct. 21, 2005).
365. Human Trafficking & Modern-day Slavery, supra note 347.
366. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
367. Miller, supra note 361.
368. Id.
369. Human Trafficking & Modern-day Slavery, supra note 347.
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C. JudicialRemedies
Prior to enactment of the VTVPA, the challenge of prosecuting
trafficking cases was formidable. According to a study prepared by the
Center for the Study of Intelligence in 1999, the Department of Justice's
Department of Involuntary Servitude Coordinator had prosecuted
"numerous modern-day slavery" and trafficking cases involving over 150
victims during the prior three years.370 The number of victims assisted
seems inconsequential compared to the number of victims trafficked into
the United States annually (17,000 to 20,000 per year according to more
recent Department of State reports). 37' However, the numbers are
reflective of the difficulties prosecutors encounter in identifying the
victims of trafficking as well as the labor intensive nature of prosecuting
the cases.
Since the enactment of the VTVPA, the Department of Justice has
made a concerted effort to increase trafficking investigations and
prosecutions. According to a recent report on the United States' efforts,
[a]s of April 2004, the Criminal Section of the Civil Rights
Division had 153 open trafficking investigations-twice as many
as compared with three years earlier. Over one-half of these
investigations were initiated as a result of the "Trafficking in
Persons and Worker Exploitation Task Force Complaint Line,"
...established in February 2000. In fiscal years 2001 through
2003, the Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division and US
Attorneys Offices initiated prosecutions of 110 traffickers,
nearly a three-fold increase compared to the previous three
fiscal years. In fiscal years 2001 through 2003, the Department
of Justice secured 77 convictions and 3 uilty pleas, a 50 percent
increase over the previous three years.
r 373
One of the cases brought during this period was United States v. Lee,
a twenty-two count indictment brought against the owner of an
American Samoa garment factory for holding workers in involuntary
servitude.37 4 The United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) agency made sixteen arrests in a case involving the smuggling of
Ecuadorian and Chinese nationals into the United States.375 In another

370.
371.
372.
PUBL'N

RICHARD, supra note 19, app. at 47.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC'Y FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
NO. 11150, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 259 (2004), available at

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/34158.pdf.
373. 159 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (D. Haw. 2001).
374. OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC'Y FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS, supra note 372, at 258-59.
375. Eric Green, Arrests Made in Case Involving Smuggling of Ecuadoreans, Chinese,
http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2004/Dec/14-870774.html (last updated Dec. 15, 2004).
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case, defendants in a twenty-seven count indictment filed in the Eastern
District of New York pled guilty to charges of "forcing young Mexican
women into prostitution in brothels throughout the New York City
metropolitan area, including Queens and Brooklyn, between 1991 and
2004.1376 Similarly, in Buffalo, New York, six defendants were charged in
a multi-count indictment with "conspiracy, forced labor, trafficking in
persons, social security fraud, immigration violations, and violations
of
377
the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act."
D. Adequacy of Remedies
Given the magnitude of the problem presented by modern-day
trafficking, it remains to be seen whether the VTVPA is up to the task.
Many of the concerns raised by advocates prior to its enactment (e.g.,
treatment of arrested trafficking victims," lack of adequate shelters or
services for trafficking victims, 7 difficulties with the S visa,38 ° and
improved coordination, information, and training of law enforcement3"')
have been addressed by the VTVPA.
By some accounts, the reaction to the VTVPA is positive but cautious:
Labor and human rights activists welcomed the passage of the
Trafficking Act in 2000 for many reasons. First, the new law
sharpened the legal teeth of existing sanctions for involuntary
servitude, peonage, and slavery by adding new crimes of human
trafficking, sex trafficking, forced labor, and document
servitude (withholding or destroying documents as part of the
trafficking scheme)....
Second, the act not only strengthened laws so that traffickers
could be held accountable for their crimes, but it provided
specific measures to address the unique needs of trafficking
victims.382

376. Three Mexicans Plead Guilty in New York Human-Trafficking Case,
http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2005/Apr/06-922355.html (last updated Apr. 6, 2005)
(quoting Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 3 Plead Guilty to
Charges Involving Forcing Young Mexican Women into Sexual Slavery in N.Y. (Apr. 5,
2005)).
377. United States v. Garcia, No. 02-CR-110S-01, 2003 WL 22956917, at *1 (W.D.N.Y.
Dec. 2, 2003).
378. See RICHARD, supra note 19, at 39.
379. Id. at 40.
380. Id. at 41.
381. See id. at 45.

382. FREE THE SLAVES & HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY,
HIDDEN SLAVES: FORCED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (2004) (footnote omitted),
available at http://www.hrcberkeley.org/download/hiddenslaves-report.pdf.
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This optimism is tempered by concerns regarding some perceived
shortcomings of the VTVPA. For example, one report points out that
"[a]dvocates and service providers criticize the essential framework of
the Trafficking Act which conditions benefits on the cooperation of
survivors with federal law enforcement., 833 It also points out that "[t]he
approach now taken by federal and state agencies to combat
forced labor
34
in the United States is fragmentary and inconsistent. 1
Some human rights advocates have expressed concern about the
accuracy of the annual reports submitted to Congress by the Secretary of
State. For example, in June 2003, LaShawn R. Jefferson, Executive
Director for the Women's Rights Division of the Human Rights Watch,
raised the following concerns about the State Department's June 2003
Trafficking Report: (1) lack of meaningful evaluation of anti-trafficking
efforts; (2) spotty statistical data that is inconsistently used; (3) failure "to
weigh and condemn harmful immigrations policies"; (4) failure to track
whether countries credited with anti-trafficking legislation have "passed
legislation specifically criminalizing trafficking into all forms of forced
labor"; and (5) lack of specificity or follow-up on the outcomes of
trafficking prosecutions.385
Creating economic opportunities for possible victims of trafficking in
their country of origin, while laudable, is clearly a long-term initiative
that may require years to implement. In the interim, some legal analysts
believe that it is counterproductive to impose the sanction of withholding
non-humanitarian aid from countries that have failed to meet the
minimum standards for compliance with the VTVPA.3 6
Despite some positive steps, current efforts to assist victims of
trafficking may still not be adequate. For example, the new T visa

383. Id. at 22.
384. Id. at 26.
385. Letter from LaShawn R. Jefferson, Executive Dir., Women's Rights Div., Human
Rights Watch, to Colin L. Powell, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (June 27, 2003),
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/06/usO627031tr.htm.
386. Kara C. Ryf, The First Modern Anti-Slavery Law: The Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 45, 64 (2002) ("[I]ncreasing
cooperation among nations is essential to eliminating world trafficking. Because almost
all countries are nations of either origin, transit or destination of trafficking victims, it is
important to work together to ensure traffickers are captured, prosecuted, and punished.
To be successful, the United States must form close working relationships with the
enforcement agents in foreign countries and share intelligence information in order to
follow traffickers, learn their routes and patterns, and eventually apprehend them. Such
cooperation is significantly impeded by sanctions that destroy all efforts to establish an
international force to fight the transnational trafficking problem." (footnotes omitted)).
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authorized by the Trafficking Act is limited to 5,000 per year.38 7 This
represents roughly one-third of potentially eligible applicants.
To date,
the Department
of
Justice
has
authorized
less
than
one
thousand
per
389
year.
Last, but not least, unless adequate appropriations are
authorized for national and international programs, funding may not be
adequate to sponsor supportive activities for victims within the United
States and to initiate economic and educational projects in countries of
origin and transit.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Thirteenth Amendment, civil RICO, and the Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, as amended, should be
viewed on a continuum. The first, the Thirteenth Amendment and its
enabling statutes, abolished an institution that was slowly being
dismantled by some states and deteriorating as an institution in others.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, many states attempted to subvert the
newly forged freedom of former slaves. In the century following the
Civil War, enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment and related
legislation would progress from dormancy to active enforcement. But
the penalties would be modest compared to the offense.
With the enactment of RICO, Congress created a tool that could be
used both to benefit victims of trafficking by levying significant economic
penalties on persons and entities operating an enterprise engaged in
racketeering activity. While RICO explicitly authorizes a private cause
of action, court costs, attorneys fees, and treble damages, it is complex in
structure and presents significant challenges to plaintiffs seeking to use it.
It compensates victims only for injuries to business and property and can
be used to reach foreign trafficking activities only if certain stringent
criteria are satisfied.
Of these three remedies, the Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000 shows the most promise. It builds upon and
extends the elements of the Thirteenth Amendment and civil RICO. It
reaffirms the underlying premise of the Thirteenth Amendment that
slavery is an abhorrent institution that must be abolished. Unlike civil
RICO, it acknowledges the individual needs of trafficking victims. As
amended, it creates a private cause of action for victims. It strengthens
the mandate of the federal government to interdict modern-day slavery
and brings a full array of federal agency resources to bear on the
387. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(o)(2) (2000); see also Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreshchyshyn,
Human Trafficking Private Right of Action: Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the
United States, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 2 n.3 (2004).
388. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
389. Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 387, at 14.
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problem.
In doing so, it revitalizes the Civil Rights Division of
Department of Justice's capacity to develop a coherent body of favorable
case law on trafficking, as the division did in its Thirteenth Amendment
litigation in the 1930s and 1940s. Equally important, unlike civil RICO,
the VTVPA accomplishes its objectives in a manner that tries to
humanize rather than commodify the victims of trafficking.
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